The phenomenological turn or phenomenological reduction is a courageous turning back “to the things themselves” involving a radical suspension of all our natural attitudes about them, including their objective existence. Through this bracketing of our preconceptions and attitudes (called the epoche), we shift from the natural attitude to the more reflective phenomenological attitude. Husserl’s epoche is a bracket of the natural attitude we have about the world, a suspension of judgement with regard to the existence of objects of consciousness. Whereas the natural attitude accepts the world as a horizon or matrix or context for various experiences, the phenomenological attitude makes an inquiry into that horizon itself, and opens our inquiry into the mysteries of the ground beneath our normal experience of the world. Although Descartes doubted the world, Husserl is more radical than Descartes because he brackets even the belief in a psychological ego that is a thinking thing or essence. For Husserl, however, the transcendental subjectivity cannot be bracketed, since it is not an object or phenomenon or thing. Husserl thus distinguishes between the psychological ego as part of the world, and the transcendental ego as that which has a world and transcends the world to some extent.