Godlike Productions - Conspiracy Forum
Users Online Now: 2,872 (Who's On?)Visitors Today: 1,514,229
Pageviews Today: 1,955,879Threads Today: 382Posts Today: 7,201
01:14 PM


Rate this Thread

Absolute BS Crap Reasonable Nice Amazing
 

Here's what would happen in a Chinese-Japanese war over the contested islands

 
Anonymous Coward
User ID: 23978624
Canada
09/17/2012 10:13 PM
Report Abusive Post
Report Copyright Violation
Here's what would happen in a Chinese-Japanese war over the contested islands
[link to www.foreignpolicy.com]

So who would win the unlikely prospect of a clash of titans in the Pacific: China or Japan?

Despite Japan's latter-day image as a military pushover, a naval war would not be a rout for China.
While the Japanese postwar "peace" constitution "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes," the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has accumulated several pockets of material excellence, such as undersea warfare, since World War II. And Japanese mariners are renowned for their professionalism. If commanders manage their human, material, and geographic advantages artfully, Tokyo could make a maritime war with China a close-run thing -- and perhaps even prevail.

In raw numerical terms, there is no contest. Japan's navy boasts 48 "major surface combatants," ships designed to attack enemy main fleets while taking a pounding themselves. For the JMSDF these include "helicopter destroyers," or light aircraft carriers; guided-missile destroyers equipped with the state-of-the-art Aegis combat system, a combination radar, computer, and fire-control system found in frontline U.S. Navy warships; and an assortment of lesser destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. A squadron of 16 diesel-electric submarines augments the surface fleet. Juxtapose this against the PLA Navy's 73 major surface combatants, 84 missile-firing patrol craft, and 63 submarines, and the bidding appears grim for Japan. China's navy is far superior in sheer weight of steel.

But raw numbers can be misleading, for three main reasons. First, as strategist Edward Luttwak has observed, weapons are like "black boxes" until actually used in combat: no one knows for sure whether they will perform as advertised. Battle, not technical specifications, is the true arbiter of military technology's value. Accurately forecasting how ships, planes, and missiles will perform amid the stresses and chaos of combat thus verges on impossible. This is especially true, adds Luttwak, when conflict pits an open society against a closed one. Open societies have a habit of debating their military failings in public, whereas closed societies tend to keep their deficiencies out of view. Luttwak was referring to the U.S.-Soviet naval competition, but it applies to Sino-Japanese competition as well. The Soviet Navy appeared imposing on paper. But Soviet warships on the high seas during the Cold War showed unmistakable symptoms of decay, from slipshod shiphandling to rusty hulls. The PLA Navy could be hiding something as well. The quality of the JMSDF's platforms, and its human capabilities, could partially or wholly offset the PLA's advantage of numbers.

Second, there's the human variable in warfare. In his classic account, The Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt explained the U.S. Navy's success in single-ship duels against Britain's Royal Navy as a product of quality ship design and construction and superior fighting prowess: in other words, of material and human factors. The latter is measured in seamanship, gunnery, and the myriad of traits that set one navy apart from others. Mariners hone these traits not by sitting in port and polishing their equipment but by going to sea. JMSDF flotillas ply Asian waters continually, operating solo or with other navies. The PLA Navy is inert by comparison. With the exception of a counter-piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden that began in 2009, Chinese fleets emerge only for brief cruises or exercises, leaving crews little time to develop an operating rhythm, learn their profession, or build healthy habits. The human edge goes to Japan.

And three, it's misleading to reduce the problem solely to fleets. There will be no purely fleet-on-fleet engagement in Northeast Asia. Geography situated the two Asian titans close to each other: their landmasses, including outlying islands, are unsinkable aircraft carriers and missile firing platforms. Suitably armed and fortified, land-based sites constitute formidable implements of sea power. So we need to factor in both countries' land-based firepower.



Read the full thing at the link it's very interesting.
PatrikC325

User ID: 12717768
United States
09/17/2012 10:16 PM

Report Abusive Post
Report Copyright Violation
Re: Here's what would happen in a Chinese-Japanese war over the contested islands
A lot of land based planes and missiles would also come to bear.
Anonymous Coward (OP)
User ID: 23978624
Canada
09/17/2012 10:16 PM
Report Abusive Post
Report Copyright Violation
Re: Here's what would happen in a Chinese-Japanese war over the contested islands
A lot of land based planes and missiles would also come to bear.
 Quoting: PatrikC325


Yeah that's what the article mentions.

News