Fear of Russian 'protection' spreads to Ukraine and the Baltic

Part of Russia's justification for wresting control of South Ossetia from Georgia is that many of the region's residents hold Russian passports. The Kremlin was therefore - so it claims - protecting its citizens from Georgian aggression.

That line sends ripples of alarm throughout the former Soviet Union, where many states that became independent in 1991 took sizable Russian populations with them. Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Kazakhstan, for example, have much to fear if the Kremlin sees their hosting of a Russian diaspora as a licence to ignore their borders.

The problem is not just one of nationality. Russianness is an elastic concept, covering millions who speak Russian as their first language but who, in the Soviet era, were classified as Belarussians, Ukrainians, Jews or Ossetians. To make matters worse, many of the areas where Russians or Russian-speakers predominate are the subject of territorial disputes that pre-date even the USSR.

Officially, 17.3 per cent of people living in Ukraine are ethnic Russians (around 8 million people). But more have Russian as a first language and they are concentrated in the east of the country, which nationalists in Moscow argue is culturally indivisible from the old Slavic motherland. Ukrainian nationalists vehemently disagree. The same goes for Belarus (official Russian population: 11.4 per cent, around 1 million people).

But the greatest tensions are in two of the Baltic States: Latvia (29.6 per cent Russian) and Estonia (25.6 per cent Russian). Although they formed part of the Russian empire in the 19th century, the Balts broke away when the Soviet Union was formed and were only forcibly reassimilated during the Second World War. Stalin then waged a brutal demographic war, shipping ethnic Latvians and Estonians to Siberia, and settling Russians in their place.

When they regained independence, Latvia and Estonia didn't give citizenship to many of their resident Russians, whom they saw as the remnants of an occupying force. Moscow continues to agitate on behalf of them, which the Balts see as flagrant imperialism. Last year rioting broke out in Tallinn between Estonians and Russians over a decision to take down a Soviet-era war memorial.

Where the allegiance of the millions of Russians spread throughout the former USSR lies isn't known. But it is clear that the Kremlin sees itself as their rightful protector. Or rather, it sees strategic advantage in laying claim to that status.