WHEN they get the food, seeds, and water all tied up-think of how agreeable many will suddenly become
If they accomplish this-it is GAME OVER for humanity i,ho
[link to www.saynotogmos.org
Bill Lashmett watched as two or three cows were let into a feeding area at a time. The first trough they came to contained fifty pounds of shelled Bt corn. The cows sniffed it, withdrew, and walked over to the next trough, which contained fifty pounds of natural shelled corn. The cows finished it off. When they were gone and released from the pen, the next group came in and did the same thing. Lashmett said the same experiment was conducted on about six or seven farms in Northwest Iowa, in 1998 and again in 1999. Identical trials with hogs yielded the same results, also for two years in a row.
same as my cat food before my cat died...liver and kidney failure is constant throughout the studies
Even the cows perceive the problem...COWS do but humans do not???
"The reason why Monsanto can claim scientific soundness is that they are only answering the technical question, 'Can I move this gene and this characteristic from A to B?' They are not asking the questions that the current understanding of cell biology demands.
You can ask the technical question and get the answer you are looking for. You can take a gene from A and put it into B. We know that. But that's the only question we can answer with certainty. We now realize that there are a whole host of other questions.
"Genes exist in networks, interactive networks which have a logic of their own. The technology point of view does not deal with these networks. It simply addresses genes in isolation.
But genes do not exist in isolation. And the fact that the industry folks don't deal with these networks is what makes their science incomplete and dangerous.
If you send these new genetic structures out into the world, into hundreds of thousands of acres, you're going into the world with a premature application of a scientific principle.
"We're in a crisis position where we know the weakness of the genetic concept, but we don't know how to incorporate it into a new, more complete understanding.
Monsanto knows this. DuPont knows this. Novartis knows this. They all know what I know.
But they don't want to look at it because it's too complicated and it's going to cost too much to figure out. The number of questions, the number of possibilities for what happens to a cell, to the whole organism when you insert a foreign gene, are almost incalculable.
And the time it would take to assess the infinite possibilities that arise is beyond the capabilities of computers. But that's what you get when you're dealing with living systems."
[link to www.mindfully.org
4. In 1989, I anticipated that there could be serious health risks to the British cattle and human populations from the practice of feeding cattle rendered meat from sheep and other animals. I published my warnings in Food Microbiology, 1990. In this article, I explained the nature of the malady that could result.
This was the first prediction of what eventually became the "mad cow" epidemic in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the govern
Had they properly assessed and acted upon the information I presented, much hardship would have been avoided, and the citizens would not have been subjected to as high a degree of risk.
(Because of the long latency period between exposure to the infectious agent and development of symptoms, there is a potential for widespread incidence of infection within the British public over the next forty years.)
5. It is my considered judgment that employing the process of recombinant DNA technology (genetic engineering) in producing new plant varieties entails a set of risks to the health of the consumer that are not ordinarily presented by traditional breeding techniques.
It is also my considered judgment that food products derived from such genetically engineered organisms are not generally recognized as safe on the basis of scientific procedures within the community of experts qualified to assess their safety. Paragraphs 6 through 10 explain why these new foods entail higher risks, and paragraphs 12 through 15 explain why none of them is generally recognized as safe.
6. Recombinant DNA technology is an inherently risky method for producing new foods. Its risks are in large part due to the complexity and interdependency of the parts of a living system, including its DNA. Wedging foreign genetic material in an essentially random manner into an organism's genome necessarily causes some degree of disruption, and the disruption could be multi-faceted.
Further, whether singular or multi-faceted, the disruptive influence could well result in the presence of unexpected toxins or allergens or in the degradation of nutritional value.
Further, because of the complexity and interactivity of living systems -- and because of the extent to which our understanding of them is still quite deficient -- it is impossible to predict what specific problems could result in the case of any particular genetically engineered organism.
Prediction is even more difficult because even when dealing with one variety of a food-producing organism and one particular set of foreign genetic material, each insertion event is unique and can yield deeply different results.
7. The mechanics and risks of recombinant DNA technology are substantially different from those of natural methods of breeding. The latter are typically based on sexual reproduction between organisms of the same or closely related species.
Normally, entire sets of genes are paired in an orderly manner that maintains a fixed sequence of genetic information.
Every gene remains under the control of the organism's intricately balanced regulatory system.
The substances produced by the genes are those that have been within the species for a long stretch of biological time.
(In cases where mating is between closely related species, there is generally close correspondence between the substances produced by each.)
In contrast, biotechnicians take cells that are the result of normal reproduction and randomly splice a chunk of foreign genetic material into their genome.
This always disturbs the function of the region of native DNA into which the material wedges. Further, the foreign genes will usually not express within their new environment without a big artificial boost, which is supplied by fusing them to promoters from viruses or pathogenic bacteria.
As a result, these genes operate essentially as independent agents outside the host organism's regulatory system, which can lead to many deleterious imbalances.
Moreover, this unregulated activity produces substances that have never been in the host species before and are usually very different from any that have -- which could lead to problems even if production were at a low rather than a high level.
There are several other major differences between genetic engineering and traditional breeding, all of which could, as can the above-mentioned ones, induce the presence of unpredicted toxins or allergens or the degradation of nutritional value.
more at this link [link to www.saynotogmos.org
Genetic engineering superviruses
The top news in the Jan. 13 issue of the New Scientist  was on a deadly virus created accidentally by researchers in Canberra Australia, who were trying to genetic engineer a contraceptive vaccine for mice . They spliced a gene for the protein interleukin-4 (IL-4) into a relatively harmless mousepox virus in the hope that IL-4 would boost the immune system. When they injected the recombinant virus into mice belonging to a strain genetically resistant to mouse-pox virus, all the mice died. IL-4 suppressed both natural killer cells and cytotoxic lymphocytes responses to viral infection. The recombinant virus also killed 50% of the genetically resistant mice that were immunized against mouse-pox virus.
That is not all. The IL-4 gene, spliced into the vaccinia virus, was found to delay clearance of the virus from experimental animals, and to undermine the animals' anti-viral defence [5,6]. Vaccinia and mouse-pox both belong to the family that contains the human smallpox virus, raising the spectre of biological warfare. But the far greater danger lies in the unintentional creation of deadly pathogens in the course of apparently innocent genetic engineering experiments. Some scientists are already creating viruses deliberately in their laboratories, just to show it could be done, or in the course of cloning existing viruses . And dangerous recombinant viruses and bacteria may also be inadvertently created in making vaccines against AIDS, as Yugoslav virologist Veljkovic has been warning since 1990 .
The New Scientist editorial  accompanying the report remarked that five years ago, when biomedical researchers were asked if genetic engineering could create "a virus or bacteria more virulent than nature's worst", they replied it would be "difficult if not impossible".
Some of us have been warning of 'accidents' such as this for at least the past six years. The basic tools of genetic engineering are bacteria, viruses and other genetic parasites that cause diseases and spread drug and antibiotic resistance. All that fall into the hands of genetic engineers are exploited. Genes from dangerous agents, including antibiotic resistance genes, are profusely mixed and matched, or recombined. As every geneticist should know, recombination of genetic material is one of the main routes to creating new strains of bacteria and viruses, some of which may be pathogens. (The other route is mutation.) Moreover, the predominant orientation of genetic engineering in the past two decades has been to design artificial GM constructs and vectors that cross species barriers and invade genomes, both of which will enhance horizontal gene transfer and further increase the chance for recombination.
We published a detailed review on the possible links between genetic engineering and the recent resurgence of drug and antibiotic resistant infectious diseases in 1998 .
We were by no means the first. Those who pioneered genetic engineering declared a moratorium in Asilomar in the mid- 1970s precisely because they were concerned about this dire possibility.
Unfortunately, overwhelming pressures for commercial exploitation cut the moratorium short. The scientists set up guidelines, based largely on assumptions that have all fallen by the wayside as the result of new scientific findings.
The two most important findings are the persistence of nucleic acids in all environments including the gut of animals, and the ease with which nucleic acids can get into all cells, especially those of human beings, as shown in so-called gene therapy research .
Instead of tightening the guidelines, our regulators have relaxed them. Transgenic wastes are being recycled as food, feed, fertilizer and landfills under the current EC Directive on Contained Use , and I would not be surprised if this applies also in the US.
There is a lesson to be learned from the 650 or more adverse reactions associated with gene therapy trials, including several deaths.
The same kinds of constructs are made, whether it is to genetic engineer human beings or plants and animals, and the same crude first generation technology is used.