!!!!!!! Live feed ....Iraq war inquiry !!!!!!!

What a shift of blame if Roderic Lyne doesn't push this point the worm blair will wiggle out of it,,,,,,,,

Ask Blair if Jesus would drop bombs and shoot people or if he would have discussion on how to set the New Jerusalem Kingdom of God on Earth up.


Tue Jan 11/17

Roderic Lyne fail ,,,he had him why didn't he push it ,,,,,,,

If the troops didn't have the equipment in place to protect them from Bio, nuke ect ....does that not indicate that they knew there was no need for that equipment.........ie no bio ect in Iraq !!!!!!!!

TPTB still value him to much!

indeed..

Blair said "We avoided a humanitarian disaster"

Live feed [link to www.iraqinquiry.org.uk]

Picture God with Jesus at his right side looking at Blair and being his judge.

God asks:

So why did you order others to blow up and shoot other people?


Tue Jan 11/17

I don't think they would ask ,,,direct to hell no stops on the way ,,,,,,,,,

15.11 Prashar asks why so many witnesses have said the aftermath planning was deficient? Blair say the US got it wrong. We would do differently but thought about what we would face and planned for it.

15.08 Prashar asks if Blair understood that UK would be in Southern Iraq as occupying power. Blair says it was clear from Jan 03 onwards that we were going to be in charge of Basra. The idea was to get an Iraqi resolution in very quickly.

15.06 Prashar asks if Blair had planned adequately for all eventualities. Blair says they did. Planning assumption was functioning civil service. Found a completely broken system.

15.03 Prashar asks about planning for post-war. It didn’t work. Blair said we did an immense amount of planning. The problem was that our focus was on things that did not turn out to be problems. We avoided a humanitarian disaster. Also oilfields were not set on fire and no CBW.

15.02 Prashar asks why they were reluctant to have military preparedness. Blair repeats that UN route was aimed at avoiding war.

14.59 Prashar asked if military were just being can-do? Blair says they are usually very blunt. They said they could do it and they did. Discussion of delay in visible preparedness until end of 02/Jan 03. Blair says on issues to do with logistics, I needed to know from them that they could do it. they said they could and they were. Prashar asks if Blair was ever warned about implications. Blair says he always took the attitude that you have to back the armed forces. Prashar says the formal approval did not come till Jan 03 and they were not ready.

14.55 They have moved on to planning for invasion. Prashar asking the questions. Talking about 1997 strategic defence review. Lead time for large operation six months. Clock would have started ticking autumn 2002. Were you aware of implications of delay? Yes we were worried about visibility of planning. But at end of Oct 02 when Hoon said we have to get on with it, we did. Boyce said that he was fully confident that we were ready.

14.52 Lyne asks about Goldsmith preparing for possibility of legal challenge. Blair had to decide that this was a strong enough legal basis for war. How convinced were you was that you had a strong case? Blair says he just needed Goldsmith to come to a clear view. That’s what he had to do, he did it. Would not have done it if he didn’t believe it.

14.51 Lyne points out that Goldsmith did not have wide support for his view. Blair says that it is pretty obvious you can make a case on it.

14.50 Blair claims that AG changed his mind because Blix reports showed that SH had failed to take final opportunity. Discussion with Christopher Greenwood. Lyne asks if other countries were arguing in favour of revival argument. Blair is a strong believer that 1441 does what he says.

14.48 Blair has just claimed to have had discussion in autumn 02 where Bush acknowledged that if SH complied there would be no war. (There is no evidence for this!)

14.45 Lyne asks what discussions Blair and others had with Goldsmith between 7 and 14 March? Blair cannot recall. Gives a summary of what happened. Goes back to 1441 – hard to argue… whole spirit was on last chance… this is the moment when he takes that chance…that a further resolution was necessary.

14.42 Lyne says that Goldsmith was not offering options. Would it have been a good idea to know earlier that a second resolution was necessary? Blair says he did say it was best to get a second resolution. Further discussion of technicalities of 1441. Lyne keeps having to bring Blair back to February 03, where the lawyers were saying that a further resolution was needed. Blair says it was a disagreement between our lawyers and the US. Discussion of what changed Goldsmith’s mind, last thing was discussion with US.

14.36 Lyne refers to Goldsmith discussion with Powell November 02 after 1441. Not optimistic that 1441 would provide for use of force. Suggested that desirable to provide advice at this point. Not encouraged. Further discouragement later but encouraged to put draft advice to Blair > 14 January. Lyne says that by now armed forces were instructed to prepare for war. Seeking new UN resolution. Should you not have had advice by now? No it was important for him to explain concerns. If Peter had said it could not be justified, we could not have taken action. Lyne asks if it was possible that this would happen you had the troops there. Blair describes Goldsmith’s change of mind. Hasn’t answered question.

14.33 Lyne says AG was not at cabinet and rarely included in other discussions. why had you not thought it right to involve him more closely? He was closely involved, on own initiative. Lyne points out that AG got to the point of nearly going to war only having gone to cabinet once. Blair says AG made clear that if he had advice to give, he would give it. Lyne refers to AG advice of 30 July 2002. Not in public domain. Why was this not welcome? It was not that it was not welcome. It was another issue to deal with. But helpful. Wanted to make it absolutely clear getting right resolution is important.

14.30 Lyne asks going back to first half of 2002. Did you seek legal advice? We got a paper. We had taken action in 1998 on the basis of the revival of 678. One of the most important things was the legal advice. Do you remember where that advice came from? Blair says from FCO. Lyne asks why Blair did not consult AG at this stage? We were a long way from taking action. What I took from the advice was that we needed a fresh resolution.

An Blair answer's didn't yea no? there's no profit in peace

15 minute break

There is Prosperity in Peace
Haven't seen much of either lately
Have You?

15.19 Chilcot says there was in terms of planning for aftermath on British side, there was a single set of assumptions on UK side, over optimistic, no real risk analysis. We knew we knew very little about what was inside Iraq. Looking to the future, is it ever set to look at a single set of assumptions unless they can be tested against worst case? Blair says we did focus and try to drill down. Had exchanges with Short. In future you are best to make assumption that these kind of failed states are always going to be tough. Are we prepared to be in for the long term.

15.16 Discussion of Iraq governing council post war. Prashar says that ORHA replaced by CPA without any consultation with us. We were joint occupying power? Blair says we were consulted. But even if we had focussed more we would have focussed on the same things. Learned lessons. Did not think Al qaeda and Iran would play the role they did.

15.12 Prashar asks about trying to get the US to accept a UN role in post-war Iraq. Turnbull said that Bush was fobbing us off. Discussion of UN role. Was it to be lead or vital role. Discussion of 1443. Prashar says that in Autumn 2002 sensible questions were being asked. Blair says US got it wrong but does not accept that UK reliance on their assurances was a problem.

No and after listening to Blair i think we can understand why

Last Edited by Freeman of the land on 01/29/2010 10:31 AM

Blair spin in overdrive

Even before Tony Blair appears today, his “friends” have been briefing the media about what he is going to say. How very typical. The Guardian’s Patrick Wintour, who was rather close to Blair when he was prime minister, has quite a detailed account of Blair’s defence. The BBC has also been briefed.

What is interesting is that Blair’s “friends” already see his letters to Bush as potentially damaging enough to deserve a spin campaign of their own.


The Chilcot inquiry has copies of correspondence between Blair and Bush, but the Cabinet Office has blocked their declassification on the basis that they might undermine future US-UK relations. Blair’s friends say the letters would merely show that the two leaders agreed it was right to require Saddam to be disarmed, and if this could not be achieved by diplomacy, then force would be used. “It would be good for Tony if these letters were published. They show him fighting his corner with Bush,” said an ally who has seen the bulk of the letters.

“I do not believe any of them show he is saying he will commit British troops unconditionally. He is supportive, but Bush is quite a simple man who won’t read beyond the first paragraph if you don’t say you are with him. I don’t think they can be published. They go the heart of the UK-US relations. They are full of scurrilous remarks about other people, including [Jacques] Chirac.”


This is the usual tactic of a non-denial coupled with a justification. They can say this because it doesn’t look as if the letters will be published or quoted from today.

Interesting that Blair ally Alastair Campbell used just about the same words to describe Blair’s July 2002 letter to Bush.

Meanwhile, the Daily Mail says that:

“Tony Blair is today set to dodge questions about secret letters he sent to George Bush promising to ‘be with you’ in the invasion of Iraq.”

And the Independent says:

“Tony Blair’s long-awaited appearance at the Iraq inquiry looked set to be hampered last night after the Government refused to declassify crucial documents relating to his decision to take Britain to war.

The failure to release the papers led to calls yesterday for the inquiry to be suspended. While Sir John Chilcot’s team have been handed all the documents, they are unable to quote from classified material and may have to restrict questioning.”

The obviously haven’t been reading Wintour. If they had, they would realise it isn’t really an issue. The documents say whatever Blair and Campbell say they say. It was indeed “established beyond doubt” in 2002 that Iraq had wmd.


Now thats some spin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A long 10 minutes

Live feed back

MG: Discussing military stretch beyond the initial invasion. TB: Was going to be difficult but concerned that we wouldn’t overstretch. Affect on ability to constrain violence? Gave more troops but violence was low level in the south. Affected reconstruction.

And Blair brings Iran back into it ,,,,,

15.57 TB: People did not believe Al Qaeda would come in, and Iran. No warnings? Consensus was about Sunni/Shia violence. Straw went to talk to reach out to Iranians. Disappointing but telling aspect that Iran was de-stabilising.

15.53 MG: UOR’s? TB: Not really involved, these didn’t come to me. Funding? It did come to me. £27m because we had to ramp up pretty quickly. Iraq was key for DfID. Not so much lack of resource, more of security. Major problem was Shia/Sunni/Kurd divide. UN needed to bring them together.

15.48 TB: Situation was different to expected. More or less under control. Assumption was Iran was not going to be provocative. Input? Feedback as quickly as we could. Went out May 2003. Met Bremer. Progress was being made.

16.15 TB: Every time we tried reconstruction it was blown up/ destroyed. Surge had political direction but cost even greater casualties. No easy in these circumstance, because you can’t move directly to peacekeeping.

16.11 Freedman – When did you realise no WMD was going to be found? TB: At the beginning we were told about sites etc but by ‘04 it was very difficult to sustain this. We you aware of assessment of 500K troops being needed to secure Iraq? Issue is for post-war period. Difficult to answer. Force to remove Saddam is one function, but nation building may need more/different forces.

16.06 Lyne – De- Ba’athification and disbandment of Iraqi army – were we consulted? No official talks but J Sawers was on the case when this happened. The Iraqi people detested the Ba’athists.
It would have been sensible if there had been a debate about this. US corrected ‘pinching’ problem pretty quickly.

16.02 Lyne – risk assessment – could and should this have been better? TB: Convention wisdom was that Iraq would a have watching brief. Please to see Saddam gone and be more amenable. In retrospect this was difficult. At the time US linked AQ and Saddam and we were trying to separate these issues. If Saddam had remained Iran and Iraq would today be competing for nuclear capability.

I don't know how many from the US are listening to this but Blair is moving blame to you or your government !!!!!!!!!!

Mr Blair was accused of misleading Parliament to take the UK into war and some critics even called for him to be indicted for war crimes.

The inquiry has already heard evidence suggesting that he agreed to join the US-led invasion nearly a year before it began.

Alastair Campbell, the former prime minister’s communications director, said Mr Blair sent US President George Bush secret messages in 2002, assuring him that Britain would “be there” if it came to military action.

Previous witnesses to the inquiry also raised serious questions about the legality of the war.

Lord Goldsmith revealed on Wednesday that he advised Mr Blair in January 2003 that it would not be lawful to attack Iraq without a further UN Security Council resolution.

Chairman closes session.

17.10 Chairman asks for a final sum up and about any regrets. Blair says he reflects on the responsibility every day. Believes that we will be able to look back and be proud. (Interjection from audience). Believes the world will be better without Saddam and his sons.

17.05 Coming towards end. Blair – too early to say Iraq democracy will take root. Electricity – Income per head etc. Still talking about Al Q/Iran. States Iraqis believe things are getting better. Refers to death rates under Saddam.

17.00 BP: About delivery. Blair speaks about meetings. BP: Re Tim Cross (no-one was driving this). TB accepts point about minister in charge. BP: quickfire qns TB: refers to ISG – states Saddam never intended to comply with UN. Qn on machinery of govt etc.

16.53 JC: Asks about policy objective approaches. TB: Legal advice was asked from from Mar 2002 and was part of framework. JC: Policy could have been blocked at a late stage – was this avoidable? TB: answers about Kosovo (??)

16.49 BP: Goldsmith – if Attorney could discuss issues in Cabinet would this have prevented qns? TB: People had basic legal framework. He felt confident to give his opinion. Cabinet did not want to become part of the legal debate. No discussion on 17 March advice? I think Andrew Turnbull explained Goldsmith was there to answer questions. We were focused on political as well as legal questions.

16.44 JC – states doesn’t want to re-cover Butler issues but cabinet discussions enough? TB: Cabinet members were involved and could challenge. JC: Hindsight – was there enough ’space’? No-one was unaware about what this was about.

16.40 Chairman – other questions. Baroness Prashar – Back to planning – why Treasury and DiFD not involved? TB: Diplomacy and planning were the most important issues. Main bulk of this was to be done by the military.

16.37 Lyne – Discussion moves to Afghanistan. Were you concerned this was stretching resources to the limits? Concern was to build up Iraqi capability and then be able to draw down.

16.34 LF: Our responsibility to provide basics of security? (refers to “cycle of insecurity”). TB: We built up the Iraqi forces, otherwise the ‘Charge of the Knights’ would never have worked. LF: A heavy price for the lack of preparation? TB: However much you plan, with AQ and Iran there, it was going to be difficult. You must be prepared for the long haul, and stay to the end.

16.29 LF: Things were not getting better for the Iraqi people. Seeming to get worse. TB: Coalition forces were not doing the killing. Our response was to see it through, things today are better.

To the tune of "If You're Happy And You Know It"
All together now.......

If you cannot find Osama, bomb Iraq.
If the markets are a drama, bomb Iraq.
If the terrorists are frisky,
Pakistan is looking shifty,
North Korea is too risky,
Bomb Iraq.

If we have no allies with us, bomb Iraq.
If we think that someone's dissed us, bomb Iraq.
So to hell with the inspections,
Let's look tough for the elections,
Close your mind and take directions,
Bomb Iraq.

It's pre-emptive non-aggression, bomb Iraq.
To prevent this mass destruction, bomb Iraq.
They've got weapons we can't see,
And that's all the proof we need,
If they're not there, they must be,
Bomb Iraq.

If you never were elected, bomb Iraq.
If your mood is quite dejected, bomb Iraq.
If you think Saddam's gone mad,
With the weapons that he had,
And he tried to kill your dad,
Bomb Iraq.

If corporate fraud is growin', bomb Iraq.
If your ties to it are showin', bomb Iraq.
If your politics are sleazy,
And hiding that ain't easy,
And your manhood's getting queasy,
Bomb Iraq.

Fall in line and follow orders, bomb Iraq.
For our might knows not our borders, bomb Iraq.
Disagree? We'll call it treason,
Let's make war not love this season,
Even if we have no reason,
Bomb Iraq.

Am watching Claire Short live. Christ, she has some huge balls. She's awesome.

yep,she's ripping blairs tiny ones off.

she's talking about the PNAC documents now.