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Mikhail Kryzhanovsky. "KGB technologies: counterespionage"

 
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05/06/2010 08:11 AM
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Mikhail Kryzhanovsky. "KGB technologies: counterespionage"
6.1 "Moles"

A “mole” is a spy inside the government, recruited or “installed” most often within the special services, by an outside government/agency. The 3 most dangerous things a “mole” can do:
1. Calculate President’s plans and decisions judging by information he’s asking for.
2. Manipulate information being sent to President, and thus influence global political decisions
3. Paralyze to some extent the government (if he’s CIA or FBI Director)

6.1.1 How the "mole' sees himself

Special, even unique. Deserving. His situation (career and money) is not satisfactory. No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage. Not a bad person. Espionage isn’t very wrong – many people
worldwide do it. His performance in his government job is separate from espionage; espionage does not discount his contribution in the workplace. Security procedures do not really) apply to him.
He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. He sees espionage as “victimless” ( government isn’t a victim!) crime. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events. He finds that’s it’s easy to go around security safeguards. He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important, espionage would be hard to do (the information would be better protected). He is anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact. In the course of long term activity “mole” can reconsider his involvement. Sometimes he considers telling authorities everything. Those wanting to reverse their role aren’t confessing, they’re negotiating. Those who are “stressed out” want to confess. Neither wants punishment, both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.

6.1.2 Methods to detect a “mole"

A. Use index cards (special file) — never use computers to save this information!
Prepare a file on each officer and mark there the signs of a “mole” — has or spends too much money, asks too many extra questions; uses professional skills to check for physical and technical surveillance; has discreet contacts with foreigners; discreet copying of top secret documents; attempts to get a job in most secret departments; talks with close friends and family members about the possibility of making money as a “mole”; behavior deviations — extra suspiciousness, excitement, depression, drugs or alcohol addiction. Three signs are enough to start an investigation — the “triangulation” principle.
B. Use provocation. If a prospective “mole” is looking for a contact with the enemy and is ready to betray, and you have exact information, organize such a “meeting” for him. Do not arrest the person right away — play along, as he may give you connections to other people who are ready to betray. There’s one more provocation method: you supply the suspects with “highly classified information” and just watch what they do.
C. Use “filter” or “narrowing the circle.” Include all the officers you suspect in a “circle” and narrow it until one name is left as the most likely suspect.
D. Make a “model” of a “mole,” judging by information you have on him.
E. Recruit an insider. Recruit a “mole” inside your enemy’s intelligence service and he’ll help you to find the one inside yours (it’s called “grabbing the other end of a thread”).
F. Don’t trust anybody.

6.1.3 What to Do If You Detect a “Mole”

- assess the damage
- restrict his access to classified information and start “feeding” him with fake data
- stop all operations he was involved in and create the illusion they are still in progress
- bring home officers and agents who work abroad and had contacts with him and those to whose files he had access
- start 24/7 surveillance if you’ve decided to play the game and look into his contacts
- arrest the “mole” discreetly (if you want to continue the game)

Effective methods to prevent treason do not exist.

6.1.4 How to Cover Your “Mole”

There are special methods to cover your own “mole” and a “switch” is the most effective — it’s when you “switch” counterintelligence to other, innocent persons who work with the “mole.” You can try information “leaks” through a “double agent” — it looks like you receive top secret information through another traitor or by breaking the electronic security systems. Or you can try information “leak” through publications in big newspapers — it looks like information is not secret and is known to many people or there’s another “mole.”
By the way, was John Deutch, Bill Clinton’s CIA Director, a Russian “mole” covered by the US President? Let's see.

John Deutch was born in Belgium to a Russian father and he was the only Russian CIA Director. His biography is very impressive. He graduated from Amherst College (B.A. in history and economics) and earned a B.S. in chemical engineering and Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where the KGB loves to recruit future scientists. He served in the following professional positions.
1970-1977 MIT Chairman of the Chemistry Department Dean of Science and provost
1977-1980 The US Department of Energy: Director of Energy Research
Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology
Under Secretary
1980-1981 President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Commission
1983 President’s Commission on Strategic Forces
1985-1989 The White House Science Council
1990-1993 The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
1993-1994 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Deputy Defense Secretary
1995-1996 Director of Central Intelligence
1996 The President’s Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
1998-1999 Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Since 2000 — MIT Professor and Director for Citigroup. Awarded Public Service Medals from the following Departments: State, Energy, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard plus Central Intelligence Distinguished Medal and the Intelligence Community Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

John Deutch was appointed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by President Clinton and stayed in Langley for a short period of time, from May 10, 1995 to December 14, 1996. My professional opinion is: John Deutch, a former Russian DCI, is a Russian “mole,” and he’s not been arrested because President Clinton obstructed the investigation and pardoned this enemy of state in 2001.

Three signs are enough to triangulate a “mole” and here they are for Mr. Deutch:

1. Two days after Deutch retired from the CIA, on December 16, 1996, technical personnel discovered at his house highly classified information stored on his unclassified computer, loaded from his agency computer. He refused to explain why he violated strict security rules.
First, a normal Director of Central Intelligence doesn’t need highly classified data on his home computer, because he is a bureaucrat, not an analyst.
Second, here we have a trick — the Internet-connected computer is accessible by anyone with some technical knowledge and you don’t have to send anything — the Russians will read secret information right from your home computer. Simple.
2. In 1997 the CIA began a formal security investigation. It was determined that his computer was often connected to the Internet with no security, and that Deutch was known to leave memory cards with classified data lying in his car. Deutch used his influence to stop further any investigation and the CIA took no action until 1999, when it suspended his security clearances. He admitted finally the security breach and merely apologized.
3. In 1999 the Defense Department started its own investigation, and it appeared that in 1993 Deutch, as Defense Undersecretary, used unsecured computers at home and his America Online (!) account to access classified defense information. As Deputy Defense Secretary, he declined departmental requests in 1994 to allow security systems to be installed in his residence.
4. In 2000 Senator Charles Grassley asked the Justice Department to look into the case. There was no investigation.
5. In 2001 President Clinton pardoned Deutch. There were no comments.

Now, the question is: why is he still in the US if he’s a “mole” under suspicion? I see only one explanation — he has a very powerful friend who can give orders to Attorney General and Secretary of Defense.

P.S. Professor Deutch is still at the Department of Chemistry, MIT. In March 2006 I asked him for an interview. As far as I know, he’s still pondering that request.

6.1.5 KGB "moles" inside CIA

Aldrich Ames

Aldrich Ames, b. 1941, began working for CIA in 1962. In 1969, on his first assignment as a case officer , he was stationed in Ankara, Turkey, where his to was to target Soviet intelligence officers for recruitment. When assigned to the US Embassy to Mexico in 1983, he committed adultery with Rosario Dupuy, an employee of the Colombian Embassy to Mexico. Upon his return to the States, he began divorce proceedings against his wife, ho had the upper hand in taking the joint assets of their marriage as the divorce was on the grounds of unfaithfulness. He also began cohabitation with Rosario, who was spending a lot of his money, as she was a shopaholic. The financial pressure of is divorce and Rosario’s high living made Ames think of a way to figure out how to make big money. Nobody paid attention that he was a chronic alcoholic. In 1985 he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. and turned himself into KGB “mole”.
Ames was assigned to the CIA’s Europe Division/Counterintelligence branch, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of KGB intelligence operations. The information Ames provided led to the execution of at least 10 U.S. secret sources, mostly KGB officers. KGB paid Ames $4.6 million, and with that money he bought a new $60,000 Jaguar (that was his official salary ), jewelry, designer clothing and a house in Northern Virginia valued $500,000 and paid in cash; his wife’s monthly phone bills exceeded $6,000. In 1986 and in 1991, Ames passed two polygraph screening examinations. ( Markus Wolf, the retired director of Stasi’s foreign intelligence directorate, claimed in is memoirs that Gardner Hathaway, the CIA counterintelligence director, approached him in 1990 with an offer of cosmetic surgery, lavish compensation, and a new life in USA if he were to defect and help CIA to identify the “mole”. Wolf declined the offer, as he did not have sufficient guarantees that the CIA would not betray him).He was arrested in 1994 by FBI. Ames and his wife liquidated about $2.5 million of the KGB money (they still have $2.1 million in a Russian bank account).

Robert Hanssen

Robert Hanssen (born 1944) joined FBI in 1976. He was compiling a database of Soviet intelligence, and already in 1979 he approached GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and offered his services. He betrayed a very important CIA source
“Dmitriy Polyakov (“Topohat”), GRU general ( he became a “mole”, because he was denied to take his seriously ill son to a hospital in New York, where Polykov was with the Soviet delegation to UNO; his son soon died as a result of illness.Polyakov was executed in 1988).
In 1981 his wife caught him in the basement writing a letter to Russians. Hanssen said he got $30,000 from Russians, but gave them false intelligence information; he stopped his activity . In 1983 he was transferred to the Soviet analytical unit, which was directly responsible for capturing Soviet spies in the U.S., and in two years resumed cooperation, this time – with KGB, giving the names of 3 KGB “moles”, Boris Yuzhin (served 6 years in jail), Valeriy Marrtrynov and Sergei Motorin (both executed). In 1987 he was tasked with making a study of all past penetrations or rumored penetrations of the FBI in order to find a “mole” who betrayed Russian “moles” (!).
Hanssen and his KGB case officers did not use sophisticated communication devices, but relied on mail, the telephone, signal sites and dead drops. He passed 26 diskettes to KGB and got 12 diskettes from them; he sent 27 letters, loaded 22 packages in dead drops and had two phone conversations. KGB got information on MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) and FBI Double Agent Program with complete list of agents. Each time a meeting outside the United States was raised, Hanssen rejected it. He told KGB that foreign travel was a tipoff to counterintelligence of possible espionage activity. He was concerned about security and used to check the FBI’s Automated Case Support System (ACS) to determine if any of his activities came to the Bureau’s attention.
In 1990 Hanssen’s brother-in-law Marc Wauck, who was also an FBI employee, reported to the Bureau, that Hanssen should be investigated for espionage after Marc’s sister found a pile of cash in Hanssen’s dresser. Besides, once Hanssenn was talking to his wife about retiring in Poland, then under Soviet domination. Wauk spoke to his supervisor, who took no action.
He stopped cooperation in 1991 with Soviet Union collapse, but in 1993 he approached GRU again. He went in person to the Russian embassy and tried to talk to a GRU officer in the embassy’s parking garage; he identified himself as “Ramon Garcia”, a “disaffected FBI agent” and offered his services. The Russian officer got into the car and drove off. Russians then filed an official protest with the State Department, believing the man was a double agent. Despite showing his face, giving away his code name and revealing he was FBI, Hanssen escaped arrest (he resumed cooperation with SVR in 1999). Hanssen expressed interest in a transfer to the new National Counterintelligence Center, but when a superior told him he had to take a lie detector test to join, he changed his mind.
In 1994, after Aldrich Ames was arrested, FBI started “mole”-hunting inside the Bureau. They found another guy, CIA Harold Nicholson, Hanssen escaped detection. In 1996, convicted FBI “mole” Earl Pitts told the Bureau he suspected Robert Hanssen of being a spy because he had broken into another agent’s computer. No action was taken. FBI decided then to buy the “mole’s” identity. They found a Russian businessman and a former KGB agent, whose identity remains classified. American company invited him for business meeting. He came to New York and FBI offered $7 million for information. The Russian said he didn’t know the name, but he had the actual KGB/SVR file, which covered the “mole’s” correspondence with KGB in 1985-1991 and included a tape recording of “Ramon Garcia”. In November 2000, FBI obtained the file and identified Hanssen. They placed him under 24/7 surveillance and searched his car twice; to kept him out of sensitive data he was given a job supervising FBI computer security. Hanssen realized that something was wrong, but it didn’t stop from another drop. He was arrested at his dead drop place in 2001 and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He got $1.4 million in cash and diamonds for his job.

6.2 Identifying Spies

If a spy is an intelligence officer working abroad under “cover” (diplomat, businessman, reporter) you can identify him by:
- following the careers of all diplomats who work at your enemy’s embassies all over the world
- recruiting a “mole” inside the intelligence service (or inside the station)
- setting up your agent for recruitment by the enemy’s station
- watching foreigners who try to make discreet contacts with native citizens with access to secrets
- making a model of a spy (professional behavior, attempts to detect surveillance, attempts to recruit sources or just get any classified information during normal meetings, “throwing away” money trying to get access to government employees, military and scientific circles)
- using secret surveillance and listening devices inside the station and practicing secret searches

If a spy is an intelligence officer working in your country under “cover” of a native citizen (or he is recruited by a native citizen) you identify him by making a model (contacts with identified spies — that’s often the only sign which points out a spy, and that’s why surveillance is very important in getting information from a “mole”).





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