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REPORT COPYRIGHT VIOLATION IN REPLY
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Message Subject
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California's Lake Oroville Main Spillway Severely Damaged/Eroded. Oroville Dam's Recently Reconstructed Main Spillway Fundamentally Flawed
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Poster Handle
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Crunch62 |
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Post Content
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So Crunch....you said you lived on the edge of the innundation zone. Was that for a full lake? Now that it is down 50 feet, are you above the disaster zone?
Quoting: Prayandprepare000 The inundation maps are based on a full 900'elevation, fair weather and complete catastrophic dam failure. Instant release of the total reservoir storage (like the St. Francis Dam disaster). Lower reservoir elevation coupled with a gradual release like a slowly failing spillway would reduce the inundation area, as the water would have more time to move downstream instead of spreading out. The only scenario that concerns me would be a wet season catastrophic failure at full elevation. The river would already be high, creaks and streams overflowing and the ground already saturated. That would increase the inundation area significantly. Hum. I don't know what to say. The thing is, if they don't dismantle the dam before winter and you get pummelled with rain, and they are afraid to open the gates but the HPP can't keep up with inflow, then you might get that catastrophic failure at full elevation. I don't know what to do but pray for everybody, and I know a drought isn't good for CA but maybe for this dam it would be a mercy. The Emergency Spillway is intended to prevent the dam from overtopping and thus preventing a catastrophic failure of the dam. However, there are issues with the dam itself and the main spillway that could cause such a failure. Settlement, seepage, etc. The drought-flood cycle in California is hard on earthen dams. Years of drought and low water levels allow fill materials to shrink and crack. Then a flood season and high inflow puts tremendous pressure on the dry, shrunken structure. Proper flood storage procedures by DWR could reduce these impacts, but they have proven to be incapable of proper reservoir management in the past. It is interesting to note that evacuations were ordered in 1997 because there were concerns the ES MIGHT be overtopped due to high inflow. Thankfully, no overtopping occurred, but Oroville, Marysville and Yuba City were evacuated for days. In 2017, officials KNEW the ES was going to be overtopped, but evacuations were not issued until AFTER the ES overtopped and the erosion (that a child could have predicted) was occurring. Why the disparity? I have absolutely no trust in CA DWR. I have earned that right.
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