Pics of the " Flooded" Fort Calhoun Nuke Plant!

Ive been looking for more stills but i havnt found any yet.I do know that there expecting the river to rise at least 5 more ft .

That link sources back to Sorcha Faal.

You fail.

Its like this. If you cant look at the " very few " pics and video from this place and tell that its a major problem then you my friend may have issues.

Aqua Dams come in all different sizes, from the local paper the photos show about a 10-12ft size with a couple feet of water being held back on Friday. Confirmed they are 8ft.

Is the fuel storage pool the small building in the big lot(now submerged), or the large building separate from the reactor(not sandbagged with water to the walls)?

Last Edited by uscrusader1 on 06/20/2011 01:18 PM

Trust me, it falls on deaf ears, they do not WANT to hear it. I also have tried, failed and now given up...

Im not 100% sure but from what i can figure out its the one seprate from the reactor with water on the walls and not sand bagged

Quickly scanning some interviews they are using steel boilerplate to cover doors and openings to the reactor, it may be ok. They might have done that to other buildings too.

can you post the links here pls

QUOTE

June 18, 2011 posting ... EMERGENCY NOTICE ... WE HAVE AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE NEBRASKA NUCLEAR PLANT HAS LEAKED AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF RADIATION INTO THE MISSOURI RIVER AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR PLANT HAVE ERODED AWAY AND THE PLANT IS IN PHYSICAL DANGER OF POSSIBLE BREAK UP ... REPORTS ARE THAT THE POLITICIANS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDUSTRY AND MILITARY PERSONNEL AT THE SITE ARE KEEPING REPORTS FROM THE PUBLIC ... ONCE AGAIN THIS IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM LOCAL SOURCES AND WE ARE LOOKING INTO MORE INFORMATION TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THIS REPORT ... BUT FROM VIEWING THE LOCAL CONDITIONS THIS SEEMS TO BE A PLAUSIBLE STORY ... if this is true then there will be severe radioactive pollution in the water system east, and south of the reported area AND this will certainly enter the atmosphere as the water evaporates into the air causing radiation pollution to all points east, south and north as time goes on and the radiation follows the national weather systems ... jim mccanney

END QUOTE

[link to www.jmccanneyscience.com]

did the flooding cause the plant problem or just exacerbate an exsisting problem?? if it does flood, how far will the runoff water travel? all the way down the mississippi, right? will the government then try to claim all the land on either side and the mississippi river?

please enlighten me.

TYVM for this

and there is my answer. mostly. thanks lancifer93!!

Eroded? Some of those might go down to bedrock and the water isn't moving all that fast.

The flooding caused what ever problem they are having now. It started with a eletrical fire on The 9th and the situation got worse from there and if the radiation is flowing into the river it will make its way to the Gulf of Mexico and potentialy making it a dead zone.

All it's going to take is about 3 more feet of water and all hell is going to start breaking loose.

[link to news.lucaswhitefieldhixson.com]

there is a pdf describing how they are not capible of handling a flood.

more data here.

[link to www.huntingtonnews.net]

Nancy said...
Keep an eye on both Ft. Calhoun and Cooper NPP in Nebraska. Both have horrible track records. Both are very old reactors and both are right on the flood plain next to the Missouri River. The spent fuel pool at Ft. Calhoun is not "up" or in containment like at Fukushima. Their spent fuel pool is in a concrete building at ground level. Yes, the nuke plant that has sandbags as their ace flood protection plan has a basically unprotected spent fuel pool at ground level. The reactor is in refueling mode so it may have some fresh out of the reactor rods in it also.

June 10, 2011 8:51 PM

I wonder if they keep their back-up generators in the BASEMENT, like Fukusallma!

contents of the pdf.

- Omaha Public PowsrOiBlrlcl
444 South 16k Street Mall
Omaha, NE 68102-2247
LlC-11-0039
May 16, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Reference: 1. Docket No. 50-285
2. Letter from OPPD (J. A. Reinhart) to !\IRC (Document Control
Desk), dated April 4, 2011 (UC-11-0023)
3. Letter from OPPD (T. R. Nellenbach) to NRC (Document Control
Desk) dated May 16, 2011 (UC-11-0051)
Subject: Licensee Event Report 2011-003, Revision 1, for the Fort Calhoun
Station
Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2011-003, Revision 1, dated, May 16,
2011. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). If you
should have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
J~ t·f/JJ1
T. R. Nellenbach
Division Manager-Nuclear Operations
TRN /epm
Attachment
c: E. E. Collins, ,Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV
L. E. Wilkins, !\IRC Project Manager
J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center
Employment with Equal Opportunity
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection
request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the
licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden
estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to
[email protected], and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and
Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information
collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may
not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the
information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME
Fort Calhoun Station
2. DOCKET NUMBER
05000285
3. PAGE
1 OF 5
4. TITLE
Inadequate Flooding Protection Due To Ineffective Oversight
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER
REV
NO. MONTH DAY YEAR
FACILITY NAME
DOCKET NUMBER
05000
2 3 2011 2011 - 003 - 1 5 16 2011
FACILITY NAME
DOCKET NUMBER
05000
9. OPERATING MODE
1
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4)
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5)
20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) OTHER
20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below
or in NRC Form 366A
10. POWER LEVEL
100
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME
Erick Matzke
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
402-533-6855
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
REPORTABLE
TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
REPORTABLE
TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
15. EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE
MONTH DAY YEAR
8 30 2011
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
During identification and evaluation of flood barriers, unsealed through wall penetrations in the outside wall of the
intake, auxiliary and chemistry and radiation protection buildings were identified that are below the licensing basis
flood elevation.
A summary of the root causes included: a weak procedure revision process; insufficient oversight of work activities
associated with external flood matters; ineffective identification, evaluation and resolution of performance
deficiencies related to external flooding; and “safe as is” mindsets relative to external flooding events.
The penetrations were temporarily sealed and a configuration change was developed and implemented whereby
permanent seals were installed. Comprehensive corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes
are being addressed through the corrective action program.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE
Fort Calhoun Station 05000285
YEAR SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER
REV
NO.
2 OF 5
2011 - 003 - 1
NARRATIVE
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
BACKGROUND
As a result of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted from January 1 to June
21, 2010, the NRC determined that Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) did not have adequate procedures to
protect the intake structure and auxiliary building against external flooding events. Specifically, contrary
to Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, the station failed to maintain procedures for combating a significant
flood as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, section 6.w, “Acts of Nature.” The NRC
identified the following violation of NRC requirements associated with a yellow significance
determination process finding in the mitigating systems cornerstone in inspection report
05000285/2010008 dated October 6, 2010:
Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, “Procedures,” states, “Written procedures and administrative
policies shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities:
(a) The applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,
1978.” NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, “Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation),”
Appendix A, “Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors,”
Section 6, recommends procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events.
Section 6.w, “Acts of Nature,” includes, in part, procedures for combating floods.
Contrary to Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, since 1978, written procedures and administrative
policies were not maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended by NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain written
procedures for combating a significant external flood as recommended by NRC Regulatory Guide,
Appendix A, Section 6.w, “Acts of Nature.” The licensee’s written procedures did not adequately
prescribe steps to mitigate external flood conditions in the Auxiliary Building and Intake Structure
up to 1014 feet mean sea level, as documented in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
[USAR].
The NRC reported that the station’s flood protection strategy was not fully effective during worst-case
Missouri River flooding scenarios. The strategy required workers to install floodgates in front of the
doors to the plant’s auxiliary building and intake structure, and then stack and drape sandbags over the
top of the floodgates up to a height of five feet. The procedural guidance was inadequate because the
cross-section on top of the floodgates would not support a stacked sandbag configuration that would
retain five feet of moving water.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE
Fort Calhoun Station 05000285
YEAR SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER
REV
NO.
3 OF 5
2011 - 003 - 1
NARRATIVE
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
EVENT DESCRIPTION
During identification and evaluation of flood barriers (condition report (CR) 2010-2387), in response to
NRC findings previously noted, unsealed through wall penetrations in the intake structure were
identified that are below the licensing basis flood elevation. These penetrations were installed during
the installation of upgrades to the plant fire protection system. As a result of the penetrations not being
sealed, the intake structure was vulnerable to water inflow during an extreme flooding event. This
inflow had the potential to affect the operability of both trains of safety related raw water pumps
(ultimate heat sink).
On February 4, 2011, an eight (8) hour report was made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) to the NRC
Headquarters Operation Office (HOO) at 1717 CST (Event Number (EN) 46594). The report should
have been made on September 9, 2009. (Documented in Condition Report (CR) 2011-0801) During
the extent of cause analysis for this issue the following penetrations were identified as not having been
reported.
In addition, the extent of cause evaluation identified the following unsealed penetrations:
• Unsealed penetrations were created during the installation of the original plant security system and
were abandoned when the security system was replaced (approximately 1985). The penetrations
for the “new” security system were appropriately sealed. The old penetrations were abandoned and
not sealed. As a result of the penetrations not being sealed, the intake structure was vulnerable to
water inflow during an extreme flooding event. This inflow had the potential to affect the operability
of both trains of safety related raw water pumps (ultimate heat sink). On February 27, 2011, an
eight (8) hour report was made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) to the NRC Headquarters
Operation Office (HOO) at 1640 CST (EN 46590). The report should have been made on January
27, 2011. (Documented in CR 2011-0609)
• Two additional conduits have been identified that are not sealed. These conduits penetrate the
south wall of the auxiliary building near the transformers into Room 19 and were created as part of
a station modification that was in progress at the time. Flooding through the penetrations could
have impacted the ability of the station's auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps to perform their design
accident mitigation functions. On March 31, 2011, an eight (8) hour report was made under 10 CFR
50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) to the NRC Headquarters Operation Office (HOO) at 2232 CDT (EN 46716)
(Documented in CR 2011-2470)
• A weakness in the flood protection strategy was discovered that would prevent protection of the raw
water pumps for floods above 1007 feet-6 inches mean sea level (MSL). The flood protection
strategy includes control of the intake cell level by throttling the sluice gates and running raw water
pumps to maintain cell level. During the preparation of a calculation to demonstrate the validity of
this method it was determined that the grid backwash pipe for each grid and the surface sluice
penetrate the east wall of the intake structure through an unsealed penetration (7 penetrations).
The grid backwash line is an 18 inch pipe passing through a 24 inch sleeve. Cell in-leakage through
these penetrations would be beyond the capacity of the raw water pumps resulting in flooding of the
intake structure and loss of the raw water pump function. On March 22, 2011, an eight (8) hour
report was made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) to the NRC Headquarters Operation Office
(HOO) at 1611 CDT (EN 46690). (Documented in CR 2011-2161)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE
Fort Calhoun Station 05000285
YEAR SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER
REV
NO.
4 OF 5
2011 - 003 - 1
NARRATIVE
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
• An unsealed conduit (location 56E-S-43 in pull box 127) was identified that penetrates the auxiliary
building into Room 56. Room 56 contains the safety related electrical switchgear. In addition, a
drain flow path from the Chemistry and Radiation Protection (CARP) building into Room 23 which
can drain into the rooms holding the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pumps was
identified. On April 8, 2011, an eight (8) hour report was made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) to
the NRC Headquarters Operation Office (HOO) at 1240 CDT (EN 46741). (Documented in CRs
2011-2072 and 2011-2448)
Since each of these incidents are events that are related (i.e., they have the same cause and
consequences) and they were discovered during a single activity (i.e., investigation to correct the initial
problem) then per NUREG 1022, Revision 2, these are being reported in one LER. This report is being
made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
CONCLUSION
A root cause determination was prepared in connection with CR 2010-2387 which documents the
causes of the problem.
The following four (4) root causes explain why written procedures were inadequate to mitigate the
external flood conditions prescribed by the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). These root
causes address the NRC issued yellow finding as well as the specific penetrations being addressed in
this LER.
• Historically, when procedures for flooding protection were restructured or substantially augmented,
a weak procedure revision process did not assure FCS met its USAR requirements.
• Supervisory and management oversight of work activities associated with external flood matters
was not sufficient to prevent this issue from occurring.
• The FCS organization has not been effective in ensuring that performance deficiencies related to
external flooding are adequately identified, evaluated, and resolved.
• Mindsets existed that FCS was “safe as is” relative to external flooding events. These mindsets
collectively led to the incorrect conclusion that regulatory requirements were being met.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Configuration changes were developed as needed and the penetrations sealed. Comprehensive
corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes have been developed and will be
addressed through the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions will be identified in a
revision to this LER.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The Fort Calhoun Station is required to be protected from flooding within the station’s licensing basis.
The safety related equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an accident were affected by
these findings. The openings could have jeopardized the ability of the safety related equipment to
perform their design basis function during an accident. Other methods of removing decay heat and
mitigating the consequences of a flooding event were available. Therefore, this external flooding
concern has substantial importance to safety as indicated by the Yellow Finding issued for this event.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE
Fort Calhoun Station 05000285
YEAR SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER
REV
NO.
5 OF 5
2011 - 003 - 1
NARRATIVE
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.
PREVIOUS EVENTS
No licensee event report prior to this has identified the flooding issue. LER 2011-001 which had been
written to report a flooding penetration has been cancelled as indicated in Reference 3 to the cover
letter to this LER. The penetration is discussed in this LER.

And the tread goes dead!!!

Well, um, there hasn't been any news! I'm on about 20 different newspapers reading stuff from all over and this is not getting any coverage, anywhere.

i requested a pin and gave you a 5*****!!

they don't listen to me at all.


MODS
MODS
MODS

shin this pit right now!!!

please?

:pin5:

Just trying to keep it up in case someone gets new info ya know.

found this vid on intelhub